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The State of the Association for
General and Liberal Studies
For some time I have been concerned about the state of the
Association for General and Liberal Studies and the need for a more
purposeful role and function. I am not alone in my concern. The
Association must do more than remain a viable entity. It must become
a coordinating and stimulating force among those who are concerned with general education and undergraduate teaching. For this,
an annual meeting alone will not suffice.
While the Association has had a membership representing some
76 institutions of higher education, the membership levels have been
inconsistent and the membership inconstant. Direct involvement in the
affairs of the Association has been limited to a handful of people,
leaving the Executive Committee as caretakers during a lengthy period
of inactivity which, in effect, runs from one Annual Meeting to the
next. Membership has but limited voice in the affairs of the Association; few special services attract a new membership or assist those who
seek to gain personally or professionally from the experiences. Again,
an annual meeting alone will not suffice.
If the Association is to become a shaping force, it must serve as
a consortium of individuals and institutions with common interests
actively sharing ideas, developing relationships, making contributions,
and reaching toward common goals. To serve the profession thus, the
Association must broaden its membership base. First, however, it
must broaden the base of involvement by increasing and extending
opportunities for direct engagement of the membership at large; second, it must develop and provide services which will be of interest
and value to present and potential members; and third, it must be

5

prepared to accept a leadership role in extending and refining the
processes of general-liberal education and undergraduate teaching.
With such a future in mind, the Executive Committee a t its Winter
Meeting in Tampa voted to begin a gradual reorganization of the
structure of the Associa tion. As a first step three new committees were
created:
1. Committee on Membership
2. Committee to Study the Feasibility of a Placement Service
3. Committee to Study the Feasibility of a Committee on R esources

The Committee on Membership will be asked to actively identify
and contact individuals and institutions whose professional purposes
and interests might be well served through m embership in the Association for General and Liberal Studies. This Committee might create
a directory of general-liberal education programs whose p ractitioners
will be urged to active m embership in the Associa tion. Current an nual
dues are $25 for institutional membership ; $6 for individual m embership. The Committee on M embership will consist of the following
representatives:
John Hicks, Southern Methodist University-Chairman
Warren S. Smith, The Pennsylva nia State University
E. J. Fox, E astern New M exico University
S. D. Lovell, Southern Illinois University (Edwa rdsville, Ill. )
A Committee to Study the Feasibility of a Placement Service will
consider by wha t means the Associa tion could assist members as well
as non-members to further or initiate careers in general-liberal undergraduate teaching. It will explore how lists of positions available and
positions desired might be maintained and circulated among participating institutions ; how Perspectives and the Newsletter might be
appropriately used in such a service; in brief, whether such a service
would be appropriate, feasible, and economically possible. Membership of this Committee includes:
Paul Bernstein, Rochester Institute of Technology-Chairman
J ames G. Rice, Stephens College, Columbia, Missouri
Imy V. Holt, Western Michigan University
John H. Humphries, Rochester Institute of Technology
John Weber, Monroe County Community College, Monroe, Mich.
The Committee to Study the Feasibility of establishing a R esource
Committee will examine the need and potential role for a carefully
selected representa tive coordinating committee, whi ch could maintain
a nd update a directory of general education programs; m aintain brief
na rra tive statements describing the general education programs offered
by members of the Associa tion ; assist member institutions in structuring
the programs for the Annual M eetings; assist member institutions in
6

planning and developing periodic regional workshops; and provide
consultative service by referring inquiries to appropriate Association
members. A committee of this kind might, in due course, consider
the development and distribution of a collection of general education
texts, general education tests, course outlines and other pertinent
materials. It might secure grant assistance for projects of common
interest to the Association membership. Members of this Study Committee are:
Robert M. Limpus, Western Michigan University-Chairman
W. G. Warrington, Michigan State University
James A. Fisher, Boston University
Thomas Nuckols, Austin College, Sherman, Texas
Irmgard Johnson, University of Florida
Creation of a new committee structure will increase active participation of membership in the conduct of the Association, and help
move the Association into dynamic professional commitments. The
Executive Committee could continue at its present size, responsible for
redefinition of the ultimate structure of A.G.L.S., its modus operandi,
the development of broad policy, review of committee recommendations and reports for submission to the Association membership, and
coordination of leadership responsibilities within the Association.
It is the hope of the Executive Committee that the reports of
newly created Committees will be available for the Annual Meetings
to be held at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1970.
In addition, a Nominating Committee consisting of Professor
Malcolm Correll (past A.G.L.S. President), University of Colorado,
Professor F. Theodore Marvin, Western Michigan University, and
Dean Edwin P. Martin, University of South Florida, is preparing a
slate of candidates for 1971 elections for submission to the membership.
I am pleased to report that at the mid-winter meeting, the Executive Committee accepted the following invitations to host the 1971
and 1972 Annual Meetings:
1971
1972

Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville
Rochester Institute of Technology

The 1970 Annual Meeting will be held at the University of
Chicago. Dr. Knox Hill is coordinating the planning for that institution. Preliminary announcements will be distributed in due course.
At the request of the Executive Committee, I have made formal
inquiry of Dr. Paul Dressel, President of the A.A.H.E., to initiate a
dialogue regarding relationships between this Association and the
A.A.H.E.
I believe it is imperative that the A.G.L.S. move forward. I invite
advice and suggestions from all who would be interested (members
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and non-members ) in the development of a more productive Association to help provide more forward thrust toward common goals. I
hope my report to the Association membership in Chicago will indicate
progress toward these ends.
Horatio M. Lafauci
President, A.G.L.S.
Dean, College of Basic Studies
Boston University

O====
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The Aim of Liberal Education
By

HENRY

H.

CRIMMEL

I. THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL EDUCATI ON AND A
PREREQUISITE FOR ITS RESOLUTI ON
Somewhat concealed by the more obvious problems of our time
are indications that the liberal arts tradition is in serious trouble.
Columbia University's Jacques Barzun, for example, has warned that
the liberal college now seems caught between the expansionist tendencies of the more sophisticated high schools and the pressure for specialization exerted by the affluent graduate schools. An editorial in the
Saturday Review not long ago reported that the percentage of students
enrolled in the small, private liberal colleges continues to decline year
after year and predicted that perhaps one-third (roughly 200) of these
colleges will not survive.
This situation is particularly disturbing in view of what has prevailed during much of the history of American education. In these
earlier times liberal (or general) education was respected as the ideal
form of education, a necessity for intellectual achievement, leadership,
and culture.
A prerequisite to any evaluation or resolution of this crisis is a
recognition of the distinctive character of a liberal education. Dr.
Earl J. McGrath, a former U.S. Commissioner for Education, has
repeatedly emphasized this need in arguing that many of the liberal
colleges today have "lost their sense of special purpose." 1 The argument that follows is an attempt to precisely and persuasively define this
special purpose. If successful, the argument will both refurbish a
1 Earl J. McGrath, The Graduate School .a nd the D ecline of Liberal Education (New York: Columbia University, 1959, p. 5.
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frequently forgotten ideal and demonstrate why liberal education 1s
a cause which imposes on us a preemptive obligation.
II. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT DEFINITIONS
Among the colleges which now claim to provide a liberal education,
many do not make a conscientious effort to define their educational
ideal. Typically a line or two dealing with the aim of the college is
inserted in the bulletins distributed to prospective students and parents
and usually at least a paragraph is included with poetical embellishments in the promotional and accreditational propaganda. Frequently,
however, these statements are unabashed window dressing. They give
the impression of lofty purposes, thereby appealing to idealistic students, parents, and foundations. But their lack of rigor is betrayed
by the glossy vagueness of the terms, the lack of internal consistency,
and the fact that they are ignored in educational decision-making.
Among the colleges which claim to provide a liberal education and
which make a conscientious effort to define their aim, the result is
generally limited to two equally sterile alternatives. In some cases a
definite but dogmatic formula is devised. Typically this is an attempt
to define the ideal by listing a number of character traits which supposedly identify the liberally educated man. While the precision of
this procedure is commendable, it is nonetheless open to criticism as
being dogmatic inasmuch as the traits enumerated depend upon the
preferences and prejudices of the group making the selection. In other
cases a less dogmatic but more amorphous formula is furnished. Usually
but unfortunately this attempt avoids criticism only by retreating to
bland generalities. While the undogmatic intent of this procedure is
admirable, it nonetheless fails as a definition because of its ambiguity.
These two alternatives have famil iar illustrations. Sometimes the
aim of liberal education is held to be the transmission of a certain
body of knowledge which all educated men are educated to possess.
This ideal of "common knowledge"2 is vulnerable to criticism, however, because men have been unable to agree for long on what constitutes "common knowledge"; and, if what constitutes it is taken on
the authority of an individual or a faculty, then there is clearly no
protection from the bias of that individual or faculty.
Often the ideal of "good citizenship"3 is adopted as a remedy for
2 This ideal is present in some of the "Great Books" programs.
3Perhaps the best known statement of this ideal is the Harvard "Redhook":
General Education in a Free Society: Report of the Harvard Committee
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1945). While the committee cogently rejects
various unacceptable ideals, it stops short of a "unifying purpose" which is
undogmatic. Turning to "the character of American society" in order to
satisfy th e educational search for unity, it takes the needs of the democratic
state as its basic frame of reference. As much as we may be personally committed to d emocracy, to make liberal education subordinate to this political
ideal is to bind it dogmatica lly.
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the reputed "narrow intellectualism " of the ideal of "common knowledge." The recurring popularity of this ideal is evidenced by the
presently widespread opinion that the college should avoid isolation
and should put its resources a t the service of the local and national
communities and that its primary task is to t rain students to fulfill
the responsibilities of an adult life within these communities. However, since the definition of "good citizenship" depends upon the
definition of the good state a nd the good man, and since there is
scarcely unanimity on these fundamentals, the imposition of this ideal
results in a n education that produces only a pologists for the reigning
ideology. The ideal of "good citizenship" is therefore objectionably
dogmatic because it has the effect of committing educa tion to the
political ideals of a pa rticula r party or society.
Sometimes other idea ls are preferred because "common knowledge"
a nd "good ci tizenshi p" are though t to lack an essential spiritual or
cultural emphasis. For example, the ideal of religious faith, though
relatively out of favor today, has frequ ently been held in high esteem
in the past, as is evidenced by the original close rela tionship in this
country between the liberal college a nd denomina tional religion. Once
again, nevertheless, this concept is objectionable as being dogmatic
fo r the obvious reason tha t there is no universally accepted religious
faith.
When each of the a bove ideals is criticized, dogmatism is avoided
by sacrificing precision. For instance, occasionally it has been argued
tha t the aim of libera l edu cation is " the development of the intellect."4
This ideal seem s less pretentious than the ideal of "common knowledge" because it does not make a ny judgment about wha t every
liberally educated man should know. But the price of this modesty
is tha t wha t once was a definite formula tends now to become an
empty slogan. Attempts to specify the cha racter of the "developed intellect" seem only to reinstate the original dogmatism.

4A commendable a ttempt to specify this kind of ideal is made by P. L .
Dresse l and L . B. M ayhew in General Edu cation : Explorations in Evaluation:
The Final R eport of th e Cooperat ive S tudy of Evaluation in General Education
of th e America n Council on Edu catio n ( Washington : American Council on
Education , 1954) . In p roposing th a t "critical thinking" is th e " integrating
concept" for liberal education, an d in thus avoi ding a political bias, the Dresse l
R eport advances b eyond the Harvard "Redhook ." The a uthors, h owever, do
not specify the m eaning of "critical thinking" b ecause they h old th a t thi s is
still a m a ter for psychological resea rch . It is this suggestion ( tha t p erhaps
psychological investigations may be able to reveal th e charac teristics of "critical
thinking") that faults an otherwise sound argument. To put th e objection
briefly, the d etermination of the nature of "critica l thinking" is a normative ,
not a n empirical m a tter. H ence psychology is not qualified to make this
determination.
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The ideal of "excellence"5 seems for some to escape the objectionable bias of the ideal of "good citizenship." With this modification
it no longer appears mandatory to describe the character of the good
citizen or to accept a particular set of obligations as the moral law.
Again, however, the avoidance of dogmatism is achieved by retreating
from specificity. Hopefully "excellence" will characterize an'.)' enterprise; consequently without further specification it is a bare superlative,
unable to designate a form of education that is in any way distinctive.
The ideal of "morale"6 has recently been proposed as a replacement
for the ideal of a denominational religious faith. As a result, a declaration of belief in any particular religious creed is avoided . But if
the term "morale" is to descend from an ecumenical abstraction into
the world of concrete discourse, it must be given precision. Yet once
again it seems that any increase in precision will inevitably result in
the intensification of an objectionable bias.
The task of devising a definition that is both specific and undogmatic is admitted ly as difficult as it is desirable. Unless there is
specificity, no significant definition has been achieved; and, unless there
is freedom from dogma, the form of education defined will not, strictly
speaking, be education at all, but mere training, propagandizing, or
indoctrination.
III. THE AIM DEFINED FREE OF DOGMA
Obviously the expression "liberal education" has had a bewildering
variety of uses. For some it is the name of an institution that is in
conspiracy with "liberal" politicians to brainwash the young with
r:idical and un-American ideas. At the other extreme, and no less
prevalent and pernicious, is the view that it refers to an impractical,
dilettantish diddling with precepts and concepts characteristic of
aristocratic, reactionary civilizations. However, if my argument up to
this point is acceptable, it is because we are tacitly agreed that there is a
privileged use of the expression "liberal education" which refers to
an education that is free from commitment to any dogma, prejudice,
or mere opm1on.
Nevertheless, we must now wonder whether it is at all possible
to formulate a definition that is both unambiguous and undogmatic.
Apparently any definition will reflect some particular ideology or set
of values. Moreover, there appears today to be no single set of values
to which all men can subscribe. It is in fact characteristically modern
SThrough no fault of their own, except for their popularity, John Gardner's
Excellence (New York : H arper, 1961) and the "Rockefeller Report," The
Pursuit of Excellence: Education and the Future of America (New York:
Doubleday, 1958 ) have made this expression an irredeemable cliche.
6In "The N eed for Normative Unity in Higher Education" Mordecai M.
Kaplan argues that "morale," the specific concern of all religions, is essential
to genuine education. (Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. Maciver,
eds. Goals for American Education (New York: Harper, 1950).
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to admit that all truths are relative to points of view, all obligations
are relati\·e to societies, and all tastes are relative to the fashions of
the moment. In our pluralistic, skeptical age, consequently, it may seem
anachronistic and naive to hope for an ideal of education that is both
meaningful and more than the partisan of a particular ideology.
There is, however, a fatal inconsistency in any radical skepticism.
A skepticism must be discriminating. It cannot imply that all conclusions are mere dogmas or prejudices. On the contrary, if skepticism
itself is a justifiable conclusion, then it must at least have confidence
in that process which entitles it to be a justifiable conclusion. This
process-sometimes called criticism or dialectic-is a presupposition
of even the most nihilistic skepticism.
As the presupposition of skepticism, criticism is the logical process of justifying conclusions. Its ideal is the justification of all conclusions, whether these be factual claims made against truth or value
claims made against our obligations. The realization of this ideal would
indeed be knowledge in the most unqualified sense. Infrequently men
have not been embarrassed to seek such knowledge, and to speak of
it as "wisdom." Unlike those ideals which merely express subjective
preferences and prejudices, and which are defended only by ad hoc
maneuvers, an ideal which is the presupposition of skepticism is affirmed
even by all skeptical attempts to disaffirm it. As such, it has the unique
characteristic which was found lacking in the most popular definitions
of the aim of liberal education. An education which aims at wisdom,
which seeks the justification of all conclusions, is liberal in the privileged
sense tha t it is free from dogmatic commitment. Consequently, liberal
education can be defined undogmatically as the pursuit of wisdom.
IV. THE AIM SPECIFIED
It remains to be demonstrated that the proposed definition can
be gi\·en sufficient specificity to make it meaningful for educational
theory and practice. This demonstration can only turn upon the fact
that ,visdom is knowledge in the most unqualified sense, and the fact
that its essential feature is its freedom from dogma.
The dogmas tha t are the perennial obstacles to the pursuit of
wisdom di\'ide into two types according to whether they are theoretical,
and pertain to the achievement of knowledge, or practical, and pertain to the application of knowledge. The first is an assumption which
restricts knowledge to a given topic, model, or frame of reference. For
instance, it has variously been assumed that the paradigm of knowledge
is kno\\'ledge of the physical universe, or the moral law, or transcendent
reality. Such knowledge is achieved on the basis of an assumption about
the appropriate object of knowledge, however, and is, therefore, hypothetical or specialized, not comprehensive. Wisdom, in contrast, is
comprehensive in the sense that it exempts no assumption from critical
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examination. This insistence upon comprehensiveness does not support the absurd view tha t the wise man knows everything, nor the
equally ridiculous view that he ignores facts in a flight to abstractions;
it merely entails tha t no man knows a nything as long as he is ignorant
of those prec:uppositions which limit his own point of view and that
true comprehension ( as is suggested by etymology) requires comprehensiveness.
The second type of dogma a nd obstacle to the pursuit of wisdom
is an imposed purpose, the demand that knowledge be useful for some
preordained end. For example, it has variously been held tha t knowledge is essentially a means for individual self-fulfillment, or an instrument for social reform, or a path to religious enlightenment. Such
knowledge, however, h as been subordinated to a specific application
and consequently is applied or technological, not pure. In contrast,
wisdom is knowledge that is pure or " useless" in the sense that it is
not sought as a means to any end. This emphasis upon purity gives no
support to the weird view that the wise man disdains labor, nor to the
equally silly notion that he spends his life just sitting and contemplating
his navel ; it merely recognizes tha t if knowledge is to be free from
dogma, it must be an end (or ideal), not a means, that all activity is
"sound and fury, signi fying nothing" unless it is subordinated to an
ideal, and that ( contrary to the propaganda of tyranny ) wha t is best
cannot be what is useful.
Since wisdom is knowledge free from ungrounded assumptions and
imposed purposes, liberal education, the pursuit of wisdom, must avoid
specialization an d technology and aspire to comprehensiveness and
purity. As a result, it is unique among the enterprises of m an because
of its absolute independence: it cannot be justified b y other endeavors,
whereas all other endeavors require justifica tion by it. It is, to adopt
a contemporary idiom, the resolute concern for justified thought a nd
action. 7 Hopefully this concern will be engendered by the integrated
educational p rogram of the liberal college. If successful, it becomes an
obsession which identifies a human being and which is the precondition for a meaningful life.
There is a recurrently popular epistemology tha t identifies knowledge with informa tion. According to this theory, knowledge can be

7There are different ways of summarizing this crucia l p oi nt. For instance,
for Plato it is "self-knowledge," while for Aristotle it is "wisdom." For Heid egger it is th e exis tential point tha t "meditative thinking" makes possible
"releasement toward things" a nd "openness to th e mystery" (M . Heidegger,
Discourse on Thinkin g, N ew York: H a rper a nd R ow, 1966 ), while for R . S.
Peters it is a linguistic point: "People . . . think that education must be for
the sake of something ex trinsic that is worthwhile, whereas th e truth is tha t
!being worthwhile is p art of what is meant by calling it 'education.' " (R . D.
Archambault, ed., Ph iloso phical Analysis and Education, New York : Humanities Press, 1965, p. 92 .)
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collected, processed, and preserved in books or punch cards in libraries
or bomb-proof vaults. The problem of education then becomes the
problem of efficiently transmitting these sacred nuggets to successive
generations and the college is understood as an assembly line in which
students are stuffed with the maximum amount of information in the
minimum amount of time.
The definition of liberal education as the resolute concern for
justified thought and action emphasizes the superficiality of any theory
that identifies knowledge with information. If thought and action are
to be justified, then obviously all conclusions, whether they be claims
to truth or value, stand in need of justifications, or principles. In addition, conclusions require methods for their establishment and justification. Consequently, liberal education is not simply a concern for
conclusions ( the results of information provided by the various sciences) , but it is necessa rily also a concern for methods and principles.
Conclusions are the contribution of the liberal sciences; methods are the
affair of the liberal arts; and principles are the responsibility of
philosophy.

V. THE FIRST DIMENSION: THE LIBERAL SCIENCES
A liberal education can only begin in medias res with the accepted
conclusions of the liberal sciences. These sciences are those that are
relatively comprehensive and pure.
The need for comprehensiveness implies that the sciences and
conclusions that are more universal in scope be given priority over
those tha t are more limited. The present tendency in liberal curricula
to substitute specialized theoretical or applied sciences for a comprehensive trea tment of science and the tendency to support this substitution on the ground tha t comprehensiveness is tantamount to superficiality can be defended solely on the basis of the theory which is selfdefeating because it aspires to comprehensiveness while depreciating it.
In particular, the exclusion of the practical sciences ( ethics and politics)
is not just theoretically arbitrary, but from the standpoint of liberal
education scandalous. Wha t is being excluded as irrelevant are the
proposed answers to those fundamental questions about the good life
and the good society which originally impel men to seek a liberal education. This bias against the practical sciences also degrades the poetical
sciences. Its results can be seen in the not uncommon views that ethics
is largely a m atter of ministers and mores, and that aesthetics is mostly
a diversion for intellectually oriented esthetes. In addition, the preferen ce for specialization over generalization within the theoretical
sciences reverses the essential direction of the scientific enterprise, the
movement from particularity to universality. The result of this prejudice against comprehensiveness is exemplified by the scientist whose
achievements are compromised by his myopic inability to depart from
15

the methodological conventions of his own specialty, as well as by his
blindness to the ethical and aesthetical consequences of his work.
The need for purity requires that the sciences and conclusions which
are sought for their own sake be valued over those which are treated
as means to some end. The present tendency in liberal curricula to
emphasize the applied sciences, and to deprecate the pure sciences as
vestiges of an ivory-towerism which inhibits progress, can be defended
only on the basis of a theory which is self-defeating because it depreciates theory. In an education whose goal is wisdom it is imperative
that the application of knowledge always be secondary to the achievement of knowledge. In this situation the impediments to progress are
not the speculations of pure science but the glamour and gimmickry
of technology.
The proliferation of the specialized and applied sciences in the
liberal college is a symptom of the precarious condition of liberal education. The college now rationalizes this proliferation in the name of
freedom by means of the so-called "elective principle." The syndrome
which is concealed by this euphemism for the loss of institutional
identity is recognized by an unstructured "cafeteria" curriculum which
levels-down all subjects to equal relevance ( and irrelevance ) by the
perpetual fragmentation of knowledge, by the curricular emphasis
upon the "interesting" and the "timely" rather than the demanding
and the timeless, by the increasing departmentaliza tion and isolation
of the faculty, by the tendency to treat all students as "majors" and
to encourage premature research, by the teacher's embarrassment at
being a teacher ( rather than a research scholar) , and by the college's
embarrassment at being a college (rather than a university or graduate school ) . What has been too frequently forgotten is the radical
disparity between liberal education and all other forms of education.
As Robert M. Hutchins has so forcefully reminded us, liberal education, not specialization and technology, is the highest achievement of
both education and life. The liberal college is not a prep school for
graduate study; it has a more urgent, intrinsically valuable aim.

VI. THE SECOND DIMENSION: THE LIBERAL ARTS
The establishment and justification of the conclusions of liberal
sciences obviously require certain methods, disciplines, skills, or arts.
If the liberal sciences provide theoretical, practical, and poetical conclusions, then the liberal arts are those methods required by the sciences for thinking, doing, and making. Consequently the generic liberal
arts are the arts of critical thinking, rational action, and aesthetic
creation and appreciation. Without these arts intelligence, character,
and culture are unrealizable, and wisdom remains an idea beyond
human aspiration.
The need for the liberal arts as a second dimension of liberal
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education entails that those arts whose application is limited or
subservient to personal or social ends be displaced in favor of the
arts of critical thinking, rational action, and aesthetic creation and
appreciation. In our liberal colleges today it is not unusual to find
courses in various specialized and vocational or applied arts. But it is
unusual to find curricula in which the acquisition of information is
effectively complemented by a program of teaching and training designed to develop the arts of wisdom. Too often, for instance, there
is little systematic concern with the diverse strategies and skills of
scientific investiga tion; too often logic and mathematics are treated
as options for those students who happen to be "analytically" inclined; and too frequently these same subjects are taught as specialized
sciences and not as universal arts. The practical and poetical arts
fare even worse than the theoretical arts. The arts of rational action,
for instance, are generally regarded as personal or religious matters, and
therefore beyond the legitimate scope of the curriculum. The only surviving vestige of the once-honored poetical arts to be considered
essential in the curriculum is English composition. Rhetoric, once a
member of the trivium, is now often viewed as trivial. The arts of
literary interpretation and criticism, like those skills required for appreciation and creation in the fine arts, are typically tolerated as
electives for those who happen to be "artistically" inclined. The result
of this widespread neglect of the liberal arts is that the student, denied
systematic training in these uniquely human skills, eventually seeks a
surrogate outside the curriculum. There, in a jungle of largely anticurricular "ext ra-curricular" activities, his energies a re dissipated and
the community is entertained, but his talents remain undisciplined and
undeveloped.
The expression "liberal arts" has today degenerated to mean little
more than a random collection of advanced high school studies, few
of which are in any sense arts. Moreover, these studies are often not
part and parcel of a comprehensive program of liberal education; they
are sold piecemeal as unrelated courses and are normally remedial and
preprofessional in their conception. The unfortunate and p aradoxical
truth is that, in spite of their name, our liberal arts colleges are no
longer dedicated to the liberal arts.
VII. THE THIRD DIMENSION: PHILOSOPHY
The escape from dogma and the achievement of wisdom require
that conclusions be justified by methods in principles. Liberal education,
therefore, requires not only the liberal sciences and arts but also
philosophy. As the concern with the ultimate justifications of thought
and action, philosophy is neither a science nor an art, neither a body
of information nor a repertory of methods. But while philosophy is
distinct from both science and art, it is also inseparable from them.
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Without them, it justifies nothing; and yet without it, nothing is
justified. Philosophy is thus the indispensable third dimension of liberal
education.
While the current crisis of liberal education can be attributed in
pa rt to the erosion of the comprehensiveness and purity of the sciences a nd in part to the neglect of the liberal a rts, the crisis must also
be a ttributed in part to the deprecia tion of philosophy. The present
clima te of educational opinion has largely collapsed the three dimensions of liberal education into a fragmented single dimension- to the
collection of the conclusions of a few fashionable theoretical sciences
and a few profitable applied sciences. In the frantic effort to engorge the
student with this informa tion, philosophy eventual ly becomes a superfluous curiosity. If it is forced to pose as a science, then, because its
conclusions will be comic fare in competition with the conclusions of
the genuine sciences, its fate is to be tolera ted as a kind of museum
for dead ideas. On the other hand, if it is forced to pose as an a rt, and
is demoted to tha t motley, academic catch-all category, " the humanities," then it m ay gain a grudging acceptance as a kind of psychic or
semantic therapy which is absorbing and beneficial for certain nervous
cerebral types. The unfortuna te a nd paradoxical truth is that, in spite
of the etymology of its name, philosophy is seldom considered essential
to liberal education.

VIII. THE IRONY IN THE PRESENT CRISIS
As strange as it may seem, the liberal college's current failure to
m aintain the comprehensiveness a nd purity of the sciences, its aversion
to the liberal arts, a nd its deprecia tion of philosophy m ay conceivably be due in la rge pa rt to an underlying fear of dogmatism. Colleges
are typically reluctant to distinguish between sciences that are relevant
and those that a re irrelevant to the curriculum ( on the ground tha t
such structuring involves bias) . They are suspicious of the arts ( on
the ground tha t arts require training, and training requires coercion).
And they are distrustful of philosophy ( on the ground tha t philosophy
poses as a science but lacks scientific objectivity ) .
If it is indeed true that the fear of dogmatism is a decisive factor
in the present crisis of liberal education, then the situation is tragically
ironic. The concern with the liberal sciences, the liberal arts, and
philosophy was originally required by the need to escape dogma. To
replace this concern only with the accumulation of informa tion is not
to avoid dogmatism ; it is, on the contrary, to engage in a more surreptitious and insidious form of dogmatism, one that remains hidden
because it is a bias in the found a tions of educational and epistemological
theory. The escape from dogma and the approxima tion of wisdom
demand the intense cultivation of each dimension of liberal education.
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IX. THE PRE-EMPTIVE CLAIM OF LIBERAL EDUCATION
Certainly the a rgument presented here is nothing new. It has been
sta ted m any times a nd in many different ways since a ntiquity. Yet,
because it is a n a rgument tha t seeks both to inform us a nd to reform
us, it requires repetition and reformul a tion. The aim of liberal education is (in a very specific sense ) wisdom ; and wisdom is a responsibility
tha t must pre-empt all other responsibilities. If m en lose this insight
or abandon this cause, then all of the vaunted ca uses of our d ay a re
conceived in ignorance, presumptuous in their claim to obligation,
a nd unworthy of passion.
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A Proposal for Modifying
General Studies Science*
By

0LLIN

J. DRENNAN

The theme of this series of lectures-SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE WELFARE OF MAN-seeks to capture in a short
phrase one of the concerns that has manifested itself dramatically and
vocally among students in recent months. Although the students may
not recognize the historical age of this concern-it has been discussed
with various degrees of passion since the age of the Greeks-the very
fact that it can appear in the guise of a new concern--of a new generation-that is at odds with the present concerns of the older generation, points out the continual necessity for reexamining those ideas
that we hold to be true without question.
An earlier lecturer in this series began with the statement that
science, by definition, is not concerned with the welfare of man. His
statement may or may not stand the challenge of contemporary thinking. But, whether or not science is concerned with the welfare of man,
certainly a General Studies program is concerned-and with no qualifications. The dominant thrust of General Studies activities lies in the
direction of awakening and deepening the student's individual awareness to the welfare of man-individually and collectively-in the
1970's and beyond.

*

*

*

*

A concern for the welfare of man, if it 1s to be translated into
*This was originally presented as one of a series of lectures sponsored by the
School of General Studies at Western Michigan University dealing with
Scientific Knowledge and the Welfare of Man.-Ed.
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action, involves choices and decisions. Choices between possible goals;
and decisions as to which of a number of courses of action should be
taken to reach those goals. It is a t this point of making choices and
decisions that several of our earlier lecturers in this series contended
tha t science should not be expected to be involved . If that is the case,
and if it is also the case tha t in the total picture of General Studies
the concern for building an adequate basis for making decisions and
choices is fund amental and perhaps central, then we must seriously
entertain the notion tha t perhaps science occupies a too prominent
place in the program of General Studies.
I would not and could not defend tha t point. R a ther, I will contend that there are aspects of our culture which strongly affect the
lives of everyone today, aspects not usually considered to be aspects
of science, but which can best be understood through a study of
science-as-it-has-been and science-as-it-now-is. Such a contention will
require a broader conception of science tha n is usually accepted by
most scientists ; they m ay view this broadening as being detrimental.
But, from the viewpoint of general education, the broadening is not
only desirable but necessa ry if the goals of general education are to
be achieved . I m ake this contention as one who is committed, first,
to the cause of general education, a nd then to the cause of science.
And it is on the basis of a primary concern for the response of students to the conditions of their lives, tha t I will consider science and
its role in general education.
So, I propose to consider what science is, or what it has become
during the last several centuries, in its relationship to the broader
culture which we all sha re; then, to consider what ramifications this
rela tionship has for a General Studi es program; and finally, to consider a set of requirements that might represent an improvement over
the present requirements m the Science Area of a particular General
Studies program.

*

*

*

*

It is generally accepted, today, tha t NATURE is the subj ect m atter of concern to the p racticing scientist. And, while there are
differences of opinion concerning exactly what establishes the boundaries of nature and exactly which topics lie within nature and which
without, it is also generally accepted that the criterion which must
be used to decide such issues is the process in science that has often
been called "The Scientific Method." I have some difficulty in using
this phrase because it seems to me to speak of a single, monolithic
procedu re into which something is inserted at the beginning and out
of which something different emerges a t the end , something tha t
represents a finished product of science-and such a model isn't true
to science. T he practical, physical techniques employed by the different
scientific disciplines-such as chemistry and m echanics, for instance-
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a re often very different, simply because the physical cha racteristics
of the subject ma tter being studied are very different. There is a
greater simila rity in the logical or theoretical processes employed
because these processes a re determined by the na ture of logic and not
by the subject ma tter being discussed . But, even so, the n a ture of the
subject matter determines the kinds of questions tha t the scientist
asks, and these questions determine the ma nner in which logic is used
to implement the securing of answers.
H aving cast some doubt, I hope, on the legitimacy of suggesting
that all scientists proceed in unison , or in lockstep, with a single
m ethod tha t is scientific, I hasten to add tha t there are some considerations tha t allow th e differentiation of science from non-science.
Let me describe, a nd thereby define, science in the following way.
I will begin with the individual because I believe tha t there is no
other place to start. Each and every observa tion of na ture must be
made by some individual. Each individual develops very early in his
life an understanding of his world in which he separates himself from
the rest of his environment. This internal-external dichotomy allows
each individual to conceptualize himself in a world external to himself- a world of ina nima te obj ects of va rious shapes and sizes, a nd
of living objects, also of va rious shapes and sizes. The individual
becomes aware of the obj ects in this external world through his sense
experiences, and he constructs his common-sense view of that world,
a nd his common-sense expecta tions of it, through inferences he m akes
from the m any va ried a nd , perhaps chaotic seeming, sense d ata .
H e learns at some point in his development that he sta nds in a
peculia r relationship with certain of the other obj ects h e finds in his
surroundings: namely, other huma n beings. Individuals learn early
in their lives that they can communi cate with one another a nd the
growth of their ability to use language allows them to exchange ideas.
It is this ability to exchange ideas tha t is at the h eart of science.
Statements are made by one individual, but a second individual must
interp ret the m eaning and test the truthfuln ess of them . The p roblem
of establishing personal meaningfulness is one tha t is of great importa nce in general education, but is, perha ps, outside of our concern in
this discussion. The establishment of truthfulness, on the other h and,
is precisely our concern . Those statements or assertions tha t a re
accepted as truthful are accepted as being warranted, to use a term
used often by John Dewey. The accumulated knowledge about natu re
tha t we call science consists of a body of knowledge th a t is wa rranted
by a ca refully developed technique tha t includes two elem ents : 1) the
development of a theoretical framework into which each experience
is fitted ; and 2) refin ed techniques for describing each experience so
that it can be recognized as pa rt of the common experience of all m en .
Thus we might accept as a definition of science the sta tement
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that science 1s that set of assertions about human experience that
are warranted through the process of science. This warranting process consists of organizing experiences-objectified through measurement-into empirical laws; then through a non-logical step of creation, the proposing of a theoretical model or scheme to explain the
empirical laws; and finally, through logical processes, the development of consequences of the theory which can be compared point by
point with the empirical laws. The success of the theory lies in the
adequacy of the comparison of the deduced consequences with the
empirical summary of experience.
This very brief, and perhaps too abstract, discussion of the nature
of science has been included to allow me to speak about the aims or
purposes of science with some assurance that we will have a common
understanding of what I am referring to when I use the term, science.
Traditionally philosophers of science describe the aims of science as
being essentially three in number: description, explanation and
prediction.
Experiences are described accurately and clearly so that each
scientist can see in the description a similarity with his own experience
--or a difference, as the case may be. The process of providing such
clear, unambiguous descriptions is constituted by abstracting from
each experience that element of the experience that runs through
the experience of all mankind. It is in this way that science becomes
"objective," and therefore free from the idiosyncracies of individual
experience.
Explanation consists of relating individual and unique experiences
to an accepted framework of knowledge. The web of events and
occurrences that make up science constitutes the means of explanation
by relating all experience to it. Thus, explanation consists of making
the unexpected expected by means of a theoretical world viewpoint.
Finally, prediction is the projecting into the future the framework
of explanation that has sufficed in the past so that the future can be
anticipated and viewed with expectations that are secure. When one
predicts or forecasts, one gives a more or less reliable picture of the
future and, thus, allows planning and decision-making to proceed on
much firmer ground.
So far there seems to be little connection between what I have
been describing as science and the problems of the welfare of man.
Decisions concerning man's welfare, if consciously made, involve
judgments of relative value. Often the judgments are made in terms
of what ought to be done or ought to happen. These are ethical
decisions. It has become traditional for scientists to claim that science
does not have an ethical or moral side. Such considerations are not
rightly a part of science. Although such decisions must be made, they
are not a part of science and science ought not be taxed with the
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responsibility. Most decisions, they continue, that are m ade about
the use of scientific knowledge a re made by the technologists-the
engineer, the physician or the politician-and they are not scientists.
This view has much in it that is reflected in p ractice, but it is
also much too simple because it seems to divorce, entirely, the role
of the acquisition of knowledge- tha t is, science-from the role of
the a pplication of that knowledge- that is, technology. One noted
historian, Professor Lynn White, Jr., a t UCLA, m akes this comment
with respect to such a divorce:
"But it was not until about four generations ago that
Western Europe and North America a rranged a m arriage
between science and technology, a union of the theoretical
and the empirical approaches to our natural environment. The
emergence in widespread p ractice of the Baconian creed that
scientific knowledge means technological power over n a ture
can scarcely be dated before about 1850 . . ."1
I suppose a m arriage must precede a divorce, but Professor White
believes the interrela tionship has grown steadily closer, not fa rther
apart.
Before 1850, if we accept Professor White's authority to set a
dividing line, technological decisions were m ade through the p ractice
of empirical, trial and error knowledge and a considerable amount
of a rt. The practi ce of science was slowly passing from infancy into
adolescence, soon to m ake its ma rk in the world of m an's affairs but
not yet doing so.
Let us consider further, for a moment, the relationship that
existed between science and technology. This is an important con sideration today because technological decisions a re decisions of
rela tive value; they a re ethical, and perhaps moral, d ecisions. In the
affairs of m an alterna tive courses of action become available to individuals and to groups of individuals almost d aily. Decisions must
be m ade, and are m ade, on any basis tha t can be viewed as relevant.
Prior to 1850, or thereabouts, such decisions about problem s concerning na ture were m ade through the application of lore, superstition
and tradition. It should be m ade clear tha t the insights supplied by
scientists, or na tural philosophers as they were called, into the workings of na ture were too fragmentary and incomplete, too uncertain
to be trusted in any grea t practical sense. This m ay be illustrated
by the example of the steam engine. Although there were a number
of scienti fic studies m ade of the steam engine p rior to 1850, little was
produced tha t led to improvements in the p ractical steam engine
lScie nce, 10 M arch, 1967, Volume 155, pp. 1203-1 207, "The H istorical
Roots of our Ecological Crisis"-Lynn White, Jr.
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until the formalization of thermodynamics in the the 1850's. The steam
engine was being steadily improved, and this improvement was an
aid to the scientists who were laying the foundations for heat theory.
In fact the direction of influence was from technology to science
rather than the reverse. Some years after the First and Second laws
of thermodynamics were enunciated, theoretical analyses produced
suggestions that did lead to practical improvements in the steam
engine; and this consummated the marriage between technology and
science in the instance of this one basic element used in coping with
our environment.
What about ethical and value problems resulting from scientific
discoveries in this period before 1850? We must conclude that most
of the questions raised about science were of a philosophical or a
theological nature. The questions that developed the most interest and
concern lay in whether or not to accept the very intellectual basis of
science as being capable of producing acceptable knowledge. In the
seventeenth century the burning question that occupied most minds
when they thought of the fledgling science was: "By what authority
does the natural philosopher propose his truth?" The day to day
ethical or moral decisions were not immediately involved.
By the middle of the nineteenth century the burning question had
become, "H as or has not man come to his present place in the world
through a slow and unpredictable process, that is, through evolution?"
Again the day to day ethical or moral decisions or choices were not
immediately involved.
After the so-called marriage of science with technology, ethical
decisions concerned with the use or application of scientific knowledge
became more directly necessary and they have grown in importance
until, now, these kinds of decisions are regarded as among the most
important that face mankind.

*

*

*

*

In the first decades of the seventeenth century Francis Bacon
attempted to give a new direction to science. He believed that the
purpose of science was to give new power and greatness to m ankind.
Science was to minister to the arts-medicine, navigation, industry
of all kinds. This was an almost new conception among natural
philosophers, this belief that science should contribute to the control
of his environment by man through the application of scientific knowledge. For Bacon, the use of knowledge was the justifica tion for the
search for it. H e did not believe that knowledge was important and
valuable in and of itself.
Bacon's "new method" and aim for science came to have a large
following in England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
It led indirectly to the many applications of scientific knowledge that
marked those centuries and led, eventually, to the marriage of science
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to technology in th e middle of the 19th century as described by Professor White. The expecta tion tha t science could lead to control of
the environment is a characteristic of science tha t I did not list
when I gave my earlier description of science. I stated tha t science
led to unambiguous description of experience, a coherent a nd connected explanation of tha t experience a nd a successful prediction of
m any kinds of future actions and events . Now we must add the expectation that science will lead to the ability to control the environment, which is a t least one step beyond experiencing, d escribing,
explaining and predicting.
Also, as I have suggested earlier, it introduces into the discussion
of science an element, or aspect, in which value judgments a re inherently involved. If the aspects of science that I detailed earlier
were compa ra tively free from eth ical judgments, the ability to control
aspects of our environment, and the subsequent a ttempt to do so,
places the questions of what should be done, what should be controlled, which of several possible controls should be exercised, in a
constant and influential position in making technical decisions.
It is precisely because of this abrupt change in the cha racter of
the activity-when problems of control are introduced- tha t m any
scientists separate science and technology so religiously. That is, they
sepa ra te the acquisition of knowledge from the a pplication of tha t
knowledge. There is some of this division of labor inherent in the
phrase RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. R esearch , especially
tha t which is called basic or pure research , is the province of scientists,
while development, tha t is, the development of the applica tions of
scientific knowledge, is the province of engineers or technologists . I
would hold, however, that since the "ma rriage" between science and
technology in the middle of the nineteenth century, this division h as
been a rtificial and tends to separate jobs and responsibilities in a way
tha t is arbi trary, and tha t it would be more fruitful to speak of
science and technology as two ends of a continuum rather than two
separate and different and distinct activities. Much , if not all, of
research is undertaken because a problem h as been encountered ;
information is sought in order to use it as a means for solving the
problem.
The kinds of problems that stimulate the scientist and the engineer
differ only in the immediacy of the intended use of the desired solution:
engineers seek solutions to problems tha t have immedia te application
while scientists seek solutions to problems that will increase a n accumula ted reservoir of facts and knowledge against the need, a t some
future time, of an immedia te problem.
Thus it has become apparent that at least some of the decisions
tha t affect the welfare of man fall into a category of decisions concerning the application of scientific knowledge. If this is technology,
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then I would contend tha t today, and ever since the middle of the
last century, technology has been, inevitably, bound up with the
process of producing or creating that knowledge. Tha t is, modern
technology is an important aspect of science and it affects all peopleoften whether the people like it or not.

*

*

This discussion of science has led to the possibility of sorting out
three distinctly different aspects of science that have had their effects
on the lives of contemporary m an-and thus, on students.
The first, because of historical priority, is the effect that the
development of science has had on wha t we call truth and how we
establish it to be truth. This effect is apparent in the skepticism that
greets many statements based on faith; in the almost universal dema nd tha t " truth" in any field be supported by demonstrable evidence;
in the supreme confidence th a t man has in being able to solve the
problems that face him with the use of only his collective intellect,
his ingenuity, and his experience. This effect has become such an
integral part of our culture that to remark about it seems to belabor
the obvious. Nevertheless the thought patterns and intellectual habits
that are common today can be apprecia ted, in their potential and
in their limitations, best by a consideration of the contributions made
by the development of science during the last several centuries. Techniques are continually improving. And m achines, such as the computer, have contributed new possibilities for thinking within the last
genera tion. It would be foolish to contend that the change in potential
in our thought processes has come solely as the result of the development of science. But to consider the contemporary intellectual mood
and practice without taking clear note of the contributions of science
would be far more foolish. Thus we have one aspect of science that
is of grea t importance to a complete general education.
A second aspect of science that emerges from our discussion is
the fabric of theories and principles that make up the theoretical
framework of each of the individual sciences. Our ability to account
for the experiences we have with the world of nature depends on our
ability to fit those experiences into the framework of theory. The
sophistication of the interlocking theoretical structures cannot be
exaggerated. They represen t one of the greatest achievements of mankind and as such are of great importa nce to a complete general education. It is these theoretical frameworks of assumptions, deductions,
and verifying da ta that bring coherence to our many and varied
experiences. The total of all such theoretical structures makes up the
positive knowledge--only a part of which is known and understood
by any single individual- that h as accumulated through the efforts
of many, many individuals. It is this structure of theories, data and
current problems, together with the techniques and methods used to
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solve those problems, that is usually referred to as "science."
A third aspect of science tha t we must recognize from our discussion is technology. Although technology is often contrasted with
science, as I have indicated, in the twentieth century the two are
interrela ted and interdependent to an extent tha t makes it difficult,
if not impossible, to separate them. The conditions of our daily life
are set by the level of technology that exists in our portion of civilization. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of those
technological conditions for our understanding, and solving satisfactorily, the problems we encounter. The technological conditions
have evolved as decision after decision has been made concerning
the exploitation of informa tion that has become available. And, the
fact that our environment has become intolerably polluted speaks to
the manner in which decisions concerning the application of scientific
knowledge have been made in the past. The critical degree of pollution now suggests most strongly that we give immediate attention to
altering the manner of decision-making in the areas dealing with our
environment. The range of decisions that concern the use or the
applica tion of scientific knowledge has grown, until these kinds of
decisions are regarded as among the most important that face the
human race.
To relate the problem of d ecision-making to science in a more
direct way, let me digress for a moment to consider decision-making.
Decisions that are rationally made seem to follow a pattern that goes
something like this:
A decision is not necessary unless and until at least two alternative
paths of action, or possible choices, present themselves. The rational
consideration that precedes the decision consists of choosing, tentatively,
one of the alternatives and then projecting the consequences of that
choice into the future with as much accu racy as is possible. Then,
keeping those consequences in mind, the other alternative is assumed
and its consequences are predicted. If the consequences are the same,
there is really no basis on which to choose and the decision becomes
trivial as far as long-term consequences are concerned. If the consequences of the two alternatives are different, the choice will be
m ade in favor of that set of consequences tha t are most desirable.
Which set is most desirable can be determined only in terms of some
previously set goal, or aim---or perhaps in terms of a hierarchy of
values.
If this is a true picture of the decision-making process, the role
of science is plain. The predictive capability of the scientific process
is one of its most cherished characteristics and the development of this
capability has provided all men who but choose to use it with the
most reliable means of proj ecting the consequences of a particular
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action or choice into the future-whether it is a short term projection
or a long term one.
On the other hand, science, as I have described it, is not normative.
It does not, and cannot, specify what should be the goals of mankind,
or even of a particular individual. Thus ethical decisions are made,
with the help of science, but in terms of a value hierarchy that procedes
the application of science-or is at least independent of it.
If it is the case that questions concerning the proper application
of scientific knowledge stand in the forefront of the critical problems
faced by our own and by future generations, it becomes obvious, I
think, that the actual decisions must be made in some other arena of
human activity than the scientific arena.

*

*

*

*

Thus I conclude that three separate and distinct aspects of science
are to be distinguished. But, what implications do they hold for a
General Studies program?
I have characterized a major thrust of General Studies as lying
in the direction of awakening and deepening individual awareness of
the conditions affecting man's welfare-individually and collectively.
With respect to this goal, a General Studies program should find
each of the three aspects of science that I have outlined to be of
importance. It may seem improper to scientists, and to some outside
of science, to label the three aspects "aspects of science," because
there is certainly an overlap in at least two of them from science
into other areas of enquiry; the problems of epistemology that are
contained in the first aspect are as much a part of the humanities
and social science as they are a part of science; the characteristics
of critical thinking are as indispensable to any one of the areas as
they are to the other two. Whether or not it is proper to say that the
development of such techniques was the result of the growth of science,
it is certainly true that the growth of science and the growth of
analytic thought paralleled one another. If we are willing to view
science as the conscious segregation of that portion of experience,
out of all possible experience, which responds to analytical thought,
and is supported by demonstrable evidence, then we would find the development of critical thinking to be a result of scientific development.
In the same vein, the problems of decision-making and value
judging that are involved with technology are important to the humanities and social science as much as to science. In fact, as I have tried
to show, there is an input to making decisions that must come from
some activity outside of science. The consequences of past decisions
concerning the technical use of scientific information have obviously
become of great concern to social scientists in the last few years.
These concerns are balanced by the realization that many present
technological problems would not have become problems, had it not
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been for the scientific knowledge that was continuously supplied by
scientists without concern for its application. On the other h and it
must be realized equally tha t a ny hope of the current problems being
solved, or at least minimized , depends upon present scientific understanding and knowledge, and the creation of additional such knowledge by the current efforts of scientists. Thus, the problems of technology find their origin and, in a real sense, the possibility of their
solution, in science.
The ramifications of the above analysis can be summarized in two
points : 1) there a re three aspects of science, taken in the general
way tha t I have defined it, tha t are important to a complete general
education a nd tha t should be included in a General Studies program
if its objectives are to be achieved; a nd 2) it seems possible that the
objectives of a General Studies program might not be served best by
the a rbitrary division of courses into huma nities, social science a nd
science; to require that every course offered in a General Studies program fit the characterization of either a humanities course, a social
science course or a n atural science course may be so restrictive that
legitima te concerns of General Studies cannot be satisfied.
A course designed to treat either the first or third aspect of science
tha t I have developed here could not do so, adequately, if it were
confined to the resources, viewpoints, and techniques of the natural
sciences; perhaps these courses should be called simply "General
Studies courses" without classifying them according to area. A designation of this sort would enable a General Studies program to respond
flexibly to stresses in our society, which become abiding concerns of
the students as they a rrive at and leave our u niversity. These stresses,
like the current problems of pollution of our environment, cut across
departmental lines and even cut across area lines as they now exist
m most General Studies programs.

*

*

*

*

Finally I come to a proposal tha t I would like to present. It is a
proposal for th ree requirements, which coincide with the three aspects
of science I have developed this evening, tha t might replace the present science portion of a General Studies program.
For example, the present requirements in the science a rea a t
Western Michigan University a re a t the Freshman-Sophomore level.
Each student must select two courses from the following list :
105 Physical Geography or
112 Geological Science
4 sem ester hours
107 Biological Science
4 semester h ours
108 Physical Science
4 semester h ours
110 Aims and Achievements of Science
4 semester hours
The instructors for the first four courses listed a re d rawn from the
different science depa rtments in the College of Arts and Sciences. The
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instructors for the last course, Aims and Achievements of Science, are
generally drawn from the General Studies Science Area staff.
Instead of that present requirement, I would propose the following three requirements:
REQUIREMENT I:

A General Studies Course

3 semester hours
Required of all freshmen: The subject matter to be the
techniques of critical thinking, analysis, problem solving, use
of data, techniques aiding reason such as the computer, use of
statistics. Material for study would be selected from natural
science, social science and the humanities. A course designed
to make clear the nature of scientific "truth" and the criteria
necessary to establish it.
This requirement is outlined to parallel generally the first aspect that
I have described for you. It would take a place in the Freshman
year with courses that concentrate on aiding students to become aware
of their personal identity and their role in the social, political, and
aesthetic worlds. It would provide a balance to the natural drive on
the part of students to become personally involved and committed to
a variety of activities.
This course would seek to show the value of disengaging oneself
from activity, occasionally, for the purposes of making critical judgments and evaluations.
REQUIREMENT II:

A Science Area Course

4 semester hours

A single selection of one course from the following:

105 Physical Geography
107 Biological Science
108 Physical Science
112 Geological Science
A point to be stressed in each course to be the manner in which
the subject matter covered provides an explanatory structure for
personal experience in that segment of man's total experience.
This requirement parallels the second aspect of science that I have
described. It is the body of explanatory principles and the facts that
support them that constitute the various scientific disciplines. It continues the course structure that is now in existence with a minor
change in emphasis that should represent little alteration in the present
formats of those courses.
REQUIREMENT III:

A General Studies Course

3 semester hours
A course concerned with the application of scientific knowledge.
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Problems of the physical and biological environment would be
raised in order to study how they came to be problems and to
study the technical solutions tha t a re possible. The m anner in
which decisions concerning these problems h ave been m ade and
migh t be made in the future will be considered. Political a nd
social factors affecting such decisions will be studied.
This course p arallels the third aspect of science, technology, that I
have described. It is intended tha t the course go beyond establishing
tha t there are problems with our environment ; the difficulties involved
with providing satisfactory solutions will be examined a nd a ttention
will be focused on possible lines of action that can be adopted individually and as groups in our society and by society as a whole. The
p roblems tha t we, and the rest of our society, face in this area a re
so critical tha t we must begin to pay a ttention to them in our G eneral Studies program . If we do not, I have serious doubts about calling
the program a "general" one.

*

*

*

*

These three requirements constitute m y proposal for modifying
one pa rticula r General Studies Science p rogram. The ra tionale for
them is the a rgument tha t I have presented tha t there a re th ree
distinct and separate aspects of science tha t are of importance to an
adequa te general education and therefore to a General Studies program . I hope m y argument has stimula ted some thought a nd some
concern for the constant necessity for considering improvements in
existing programs.
When any p rogram reaches a stage in its history where no improvements are conceivable, that program has long ceased to be responsive
to the needs of those it serves. The needs of people are continually
cha nging. And , their changing needs demand responsible modifications
in programs designed for their benefit.

====000
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Anatomy of an Anatomy Cult
By

CLAUDE

s.

PHILLIPS

The Sexual Revolution of the last half-century has produced in
advanced societies a new curiosity about the varieties of cultural forms
dealing with erotic matters. It may be a little surprising, therefore,
for our readers to find that there is still a major culture with unusual
sexual attitudes and practices which is almost unknown. I refer to the
Nacirema Tribe, which was discovered, as it were, by Professor Horace
Miner ("Body Ritual Among the Nacirema," American Anthropologist, Vol. 58, No. 3, June 1956, pp. 503-07). Until his discovery,
scholars had assumed that all major societies and almost all minor
ones had been visited, studied, measured, psychoanalyzed and classified . The academic community, therefore, was electrified to learn
that an unusually large society, comprising fully 6% of the earth's
population, had been almost totally neglected by the probing scholars.
Even to this day there is little popular awareness of the Nacirema in
general and probably no understanding of their peculiar concern with
anatomy.
The Nacirema (na-si-ree-mah ) Tribe is located between the
Tropic of Cancer and the Canadian Cree, and extends all the way
from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Professor Miner has made
many observations about the Nacirema, and has published his study
in a major journal. He has identified certain heroes (such as Notgnihsaw, who is regarded as the father of the tribe and was known, among
other things, for his ability to throw wampum across a holy river,
the Camotop) a nd analyzed many social and behavioral characteristics of this unusual society. He was especially puzzled, however, by
what he calls the Body Ritual which pervades every level of the class
system. In every compound is to be found a shrine room, with gleam33

ing white utensils, in which daily liba tions, vigorous scrubbing of
teeth with hog bristles, and secret excretory rites occur. In each shrine
is a holy box containing m agical herbs for all kinds of ills, and magical
potions and instruments to produce beauty. This box is kept filled by
the recommendations of shamans (healers, which all societies have )
and holy mouth men (peculiar in many aspects to the Nacirema ) .
After a lengthy discourse on these a nd similar matters, D r. Miner
could only conclude that the Nacirema a re magic-ridden, with special
body rites having particular significa nce to them.
I h ave spent some time recently among the Nacirema, originally
motiva ted by Professor Miner's study. It now appears that he was too
cautious in his conclusions and that, in fact, the very core of the
Nacirema religion is the Body. Indeed it is now quite clear tha t the
very heart of their existence, the basis of their values, the object of
their idle thoughts, the root of their jokes, the source of their conscience, the central aspect of their taboos, is the Body and one must
assert, therefore, tha t the Nacirema have a full-blown Anatomy Cult
before which other aspects of life pale. My purpose here is merely
to introduce some of the evidence which has led me to such a
conclusion.
For perspective it might be helpful to point out tha t this article
could not have been circula ted in Naciremala nd until quite recently.
To be sure, the Nacirema do have a system of magic symbols by
which they communicate ideas and pictorial images on artificial
parchment. But in order to protect the purity of the people they
have created what they call a "rosnec" to restrict the use of the
m agic symbols. A rosnec is a person, frequently self-appointed, who
believes tha t he can read magic symbols dealing with the Body and
not be harmed, but tha t all other people would be ha rmed by such
reading. A rosnec, therefore, is one who m ay read anything but stop
other people from reading what h e condemns ! If a rosnec says
s·o mething he h as read will harm others, the law says that no one
else may read it. By some hidden magic, which the myths do not
explain, when a Nacirema becomes a rosnec his mind is transformed
into a void which permits him to read the magic symbols and remain impervious to thought ; he becomes a walking, talking, reading,
mindless human being.
However, not every rosnec is backed by law in Naciremaland.
Only those, for the most part, who are concerned with the Body a nd
Body functions have the law behind them. The Nacirema have built
up a rich language about the Body which must never be written or
pictured in m agic symbols. Thus one must not read about birth,
menstrua tion, copula tion, excretion, breasts, genitals or buttocks.
Artistic representa tions of the human Body, even in sculpture and
drawings, blot out the absolute proof of the sex of the model. (In 1962
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the elders of a large village, Tiorted, required their artists to paint
"bronze pants" on a statue before they would permit it to be displayed in a public building.) M asterpieces have tree leaves or wisps
of cloth floating conveniently across the unnamed areas, and popular
art men pose their models, often grotesquely, so as to protect the
senses from the evil pa rts. Some parchments, boldly and radically
devoted to advocating nudism, depict their models as completely sexless below the waist. It is in this realm of Body references that rosnecs
have their function. One may criticize, or even debase, their superstitions, their rich political, economic and social institutions, even
their genera l system of ethics, with almost total impunity. On the
other hand. one may not describe the Body in its most natural functions, or most rewarding activities, or most aesthetic and meaningful
purposes, and it is the duty of the rosnecs to enforce this taboo. This
puts the Nacirema in the most unusual position of being tolerant
about what they have created as human beings, but allowing no
tolerance about the human Body which na ture created.
R ecently the Nacirema have faced the accultu rative process of
contact with more advanced societies. As a result numerous inconsistencies have deYeloped in the Body Cult. For example, shamans
and their female assistants m ay now view individuals wholly nude
and no one objects. On the other hand, a m an who is not a shaman
cannot see his baby born, no matter how willing his wife may be and
ewn if he has seen her nude before. The point is that nudity gets
special treatment. This is due to the fact that the Nacirema act on
the premise that the Body is a positive evil, and unclothed it is in its
most eYil state. Taboos are especially strong on this point.
In the past, before the contact with higher civilizations, the Body
was always CO\·ered, all over. Even today, any degree of nudity is an
exception to the rule. Although some taboos have yielded , there a re
still strong feelings about genita ls, buttocks and female breasts, and
every effort is made to protect people from seeing these. But, as I
ha\"e said, inconsistencies have now appeared. For some reason the
female nipple is more evil than the male, as can be seen in the most
liberal cloth-wearing style. Women may wear little strips of cloth
that expose their whole bosom, but the nipples are covered. Even a t
a clan dance the women may wear long pieces of cloth covering their
legs and lower Body, but the top may cover almost nothing of the
front and back except the nipples. (At such d ances men cover themselves a ll over except for the hands a nd head, but on other occasions
they freely expose the whole chest.)
£yen for swimming the Nacirema cover themselves with cloth,
and many of them were shocked a few years ago when a new swimming
design was introduced which exposed the navel. The cause for disturbance is apparent if one accepts the fact that everything associated
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with sex is evil. They reason as follows: the navel implies birth, birth
implies uterus, uterus implies vagina, and, mutatis m utandis, the
most evil part of the Body.
Lea rning-houses, where children learn to read the magic symbols
and study the accumula ted wisdom of the tribe, also give some instruction on the Body. Until recently, however, the learning-house
disciplinarians proudly boasted tha t demonstration models of the
Body were sexless. Inconsistencies h ave appeared here also, as revealed
by the fac t that a la rge percentage of the na tives a re now saying tha t
knowledge is better than ignora nce, even in lea rning-houses a nd on
matters of sex. Conserva tive forces h ave now rallied to a defense of
ignorance, publicly proclaiming tha t there should be no public discussion of sex. Leading the defense of ignorance is a small band of
na tives who call themselves the Society of the Birch. The Society
not only maintains tha t the awa reness of sex is evil ; it claims tha t
boys and girls do not know that there are two sexes unless or until evil
persons point it out to them .
Nacirema taboos require tha t the Body be covered for two related
reasons. One is to hide evil ( I will explain later the source of the
myth that the Body is evil ) . The other is to take the mind off the
Body, the assumption being "out of sight, out of mind ." Given these
premises, one would assume that the clothing would consist of tents,
with a rm holes for working. This is not the case, however. They
cover the Body with cloth to hide it, then cut and mold the cloth in
such a way as to reveal it. Men's garments are u sually tight enough
to reveal the masculinity of the wearer, and women's garments a re
shaped to reveal every curve, every protrusion a nd almost every
cleavage of femininity. Instead of taking the mind off the Body,
Nacirem a clothing constantly focuses a ttention on it. No m an, for
example, can see a N acirema woman sit down without wa tching h er
arrange the cloth about her knees, hoping for a forbidd en glimpse of
thigh.
Modern psychology indicates th at the best way to take the mind
off the Body is to make it commonplace, tha t is, undress it except
for those occasions when one wants the mind focused on it. I p ointed
this out once to a Nacirema witch doctor (priest ) and he accused m e
of trying to interfere with na ture. Discretion forced m e to drop the
issue. However, some explana tion is called for and I believe tha t I
may have discovered it. Nacirema m ythology holds that the first m an
covered his genitals with a fig leaf. From their a rtistic expression of
this significant event, I must conclude that it was a small fig leaf
indeed . Somehow through the course of history this action expanded
by a kind of Pa rkinson's Law to hiding the whole Body most of the
time and some of it all the time.
Certain wise men who study the ways of their society continue to
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demonstrate the unusual consequences of the taboos associated with
the Body among the Nacirema. It has been discovered, for example,
that some m arried people have never seen their spouses unclothed.
It is not yet understood how copulation occurs and, indeed, many of
these people deny that it does; but they do continue to have children
so we must assume that some form of Body contact takes place. Rumors
have it these people get around the sight taboo by disrobing, or
more exactly partly disrobing, in total darkness. However, more research needs to be done on the rela tionships of the sight taboo with
the feeling taboo. Do non-disrobers also refrain from feeling the
partner's Body, and if so where do they place their hands?
It may be that non-disrobers are dwindling in number, for the
wise men h ave shown that a considerable number of people seem to
practice certain activity in contradiction of the taboos. The Nacirema
hold tha t monogamy is natural, ergo bi-sexual bodily contact outside
of rigorous monogamy is worse than evil, it is unnatural. However,
the taboos associa ted with monogamy are violated rather freely.
Apparently, monogamy is na tural only at a particular moment in
history, for a person may m arry any number of people in a lifetime as
long as he has one spouse at a time and a divorce is obtained from
the last one. Furthermore, studies of wise men show that the Nacirema
copulate with people other than their pa rticular spouse of the moment,
although the witch doctors constantly deny it. (There is a relationship between the wise men and the witch doctors which is worth
noting. Wise men a re required to train until they are able to pass
rigorous examinations at around age thirty before they can examine
either the ways of nature or the ways of man . Witch doctors, however, have no universally prescribed training. One clan may require
only tha t a man have a trance in which he feels called of their god
to become a witch doctor, while another clan may require as much
training of their witch doctors as is prescribed for wise men. The
unusua l relationship occurs when wise men who study the ways of
m an asse rt th a t the Nacirema are behaving differently than the taboos
dicta te. The witch doctors immediately attack, not the taboo breakers,
but the wise m en. This happened recently when a wise man, named
Yesnik, pointed out tha t the Nacirema were secretly violating the
monogamy taboos. He was denounced by the witch doctors, but no
effort was made to reinforce the taboos, possibly because the witch
doctors were themselves typical of the rest of the population in this
matter. )
The most obvious evidence of bi-sexual relations outside of marriage is seen in d a ncing. Men and women, unma rried or not married
to each other, hold one another close, face to face, and move around
the floor keeping in step with music. This is regarded as "good fun,"
a nd on festive occasions such as New Year, the partners may even
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kiss. Such activity may go on for hours with a heightening erotic
anticipation in each partner which is suddenly frustrated by a taboo
against the end result. Here we see the strange spectacle of a permissiveness towards many forms of sex-play and an absolute prohibition
towards carrying it to its natural conclusion. The contradictions stem
largely from the fact that copulation is both an embarrassing subject
and an embarrassing act. This may appear unusual in view of the
fact that the Nacirema are far more advanced than other tribes in
many ways. Not only do they know the relationship of copulation to
parentage, they have even developed a medicine, called the "llip,"
which allows the first to occur without producing the second. Sexual
freedom, heretofore restricted because of the fear of producing unwanted babies, has now been made possible. One might assume,
therefore, that the Hip would produce among the Nacirema the freest
of all societies in sex relations. This has not happened. Chiefs, councillors and the law makers are embarrassed to talk about its many
implications, and witch doctors, in their traditional role, have inveighed against it. Only shamans have free access to the contraceptive,
and they are supposed to provide it to married people only. Yet the
tragedy of unwanted children is most acute among unmarried people!
Advanced civilizations regard pregnancy as a rather natural
condition for women to be in occasionally. The Nacirema do much
to pretend that it does not exist. (However, they will do nothing to
stop pregnancy. Recently a woman who wished to abort what scientific
knowledge said would be a horribly deformed child had to flee to a
foreign land to do it. ) They require pregnant women to wear special
covering which consists of a piece of cloth hung from the waist with
a big hole in it for the protruding abdomen. Over this and hung from
the shoulders is another piece of cloth which reaches below the hole.
Thus adorned, women venture forth into the market place pretending
that no one knows. \Nhen a pregnant woman meets a man she pretends that he does not know she is pregnant, and he pretends to notice
nothing unusual about her bulging outfit. When she meets other
women they all pretend that they would not have known if she had
not told them.
Pregnancy is so much a part of Body function that the Nacirema
have special words to avoid admitting the obvious. A woman is never
simply pregnant-she is "expecting," or "anticipating," or "in tha t
condition," or "in a family way." If for some reason she has not had
the approval of a witch doctor or a minor chief to get pregnant, she
is referred to as being in a sinful way and the baby which results is
punished for her deed. Such a baby is labeled a "dratsab," a particularly offensive word among the Nacirema. In fact, all of the
important taboo words are associated with the Body, and most concern reproduction and / or sex. The most serious charge one can m ake
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to a N acirema is to call him a son of a female dog.
Further evidence of the Anatomy Cult comes from the use of
cloth to create illusions about the Body. For example, they have a
harness implement of straps and cups in which women encase their
breasts. This device, called an "arb," is worn by women of all clans,
apparently for two reasons. One is to allow padding to be placed in
front of the breasts in order to call attention thereto by the illusion
of largeness. The other is to keep the breasts from bouncing and thus
calling attention to them! Another example is the "eldrig," which is
an especially restrictive garment stretched over the Body from waist
to mid-thigh, an obvious carry-over from the torturous chastity belt
of old. The eldrig provides women a sense of both daring and security.
On the one hand, it is regarded as shaping the entire pelvic region
more alluringly. On the other hand, there is a sense of inviolability
about being packed into a tight garment which is as difficult to get
out of as into.
The ideal image of the human Body among the Nacirema has
gotten so far from the shape of human beings as to cause some consternation. The ideal ma n has very broad shoulders, a little waist and
almost no hips. The ideal woman has almost no shoulders, grape-fruitsize breasts, a tiny waist (ideally top and bottom should be connected
by the navel ), a nd hips equal in size to the bosom. Consternation
comes, of course, when human beings try to mold themselves into
these shapes. Aberrations in nature help some people, but others must
exercise a nd diet to achicYe the ideal shape. Those who achieve some
success become known as "Srats" and are herded together in a holy
village called Doowylloh. There they are paid great riches to display
their priceless possessions, and select females are even referred to as
deities. The masses, however, enjoy the good fortune of the Srats
vicariously and rely on cloth to give them the ideal illusion (hence
their phrase "clothes make a man") .
Research is still under way on the myth-system which created the
Anatomy Cult. However, certain conclusions can now be reached on
the basis of wha t has already been said. In Naciremaland the people,
through various forms of magic communication, h ave considerable
freedom in areas of war and peace, politics, economics, superstitutions,
other tribes, marketing, and what have you, but a rigid taboo system
comes into play when the huma n Body and the individual relationships connected therewith are involved. When the temple of his being
is involved, the average Nacirema becomes uncomfortable. Any parchment of magic symbols and magic pictures which deals with the
human Body is criticized, and if possible suppressed altogether. (Some
Nacirema have even asserted that open treatment of sex is a subversiYe trick perpetrated by their mortal enemy, the Tsinummoc Tribe.)
The crowning proof of the Anatomy Cult is the concept they use
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known as "onrop-graphy" which refers to those things people may
not see, or read about. The word never refers to murder, sadism,
lynching, racial hate, sacrilege, war, brutality or the Un-Nacirema
Activities Committee-these are not obscene. It refers only to the
Body, that worst of all encumbrances of human beings. The ineffable
frustration of the guilt-ridden Nacirema is a superstition based on
a longing to get rid of the Body and a horrible fear that they might
lose it.

II
Since the above was written new evidence has come to light on
the myth system which helps to explain the Anatomy Cult of the
Nacirema. I stumbled on the evidence by accident. For years I
noticed that the witch doctors of the various clans are the most
guilt-ridden to hide their bodies behind cloth. Rarely do they engage
in activities in which other people wear a less-than-average amount
of cloth. Furthermore, cloth-wearing is frequently the subject of their
weekly admonitions to the natives, although their concern always is
whether too little, never too much, cloth is being worn. So great has
been the concern of witch doctors with body covering that the people
have coined the phrase "men of the cloth" in referring to them. In
fact, many witch doctors even use special shapes and colors of cloth
to distinguish them from other witch doctors and the average native.
A second significant fact I noticed was that there are degrees of
nudity ( as alluded to earlier), that is, small pieces of cloth cover the
body on some occasions and on others all of the body is covered but
hands and face. What struck me about this was the idea that their
god would be embarrassed by any nudity except of hands and face.
For example, a person wearing swimming cloth would not be permitted to enter a magic house. Furthermore, as I came to know the
people, I began to sense a secret belief that their god really m ade a
mistake putting bodies on people in the first place. He could have
attached the legs to the neck and people would not have to be concerned with the most evil parts of the body. This belief is never
uttered openly, however, for the myths assert it to be a direct revelation of their god that he is a man. Obviously if god is a man one can
hardly blame him for building a human that is male. This discovery
revealed the third significant fact, namely that the myths do not
explain where god got his model for a woman.
From these discoveries I have been able to reassemble ( at least
partially) the myth structure leading to the Anatomy Cult and the
present superstitions. Apparently in 4004 B.C. there existed only godwho was masculine in every respect even to having a beard. At this
time god decided to create a man and did so, the result of course
looking like the only model in existence. Later he created, without
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any model at all, a woma n who was physiologically different from the
man in certain respects. The differences were complementary and
when properly conjoined could produce pleasure and happiness.
H owever, god frowned on a ny happiness the man obtained by taking
advantage of the physiological differences. Apparently god, who faced
no temptation for simila r pleasure, expected man to live as god himself did (although there are gaps in the myth here, for now it is
unclear ·why god made woman at all ) .
The woman, not being like god, tempted the man and he yielded .
God became enraged a nd drove both of them from paradise to inhabit the earth. The man in his turn became angry at the woman
and ordered her to hide the evil pa rts of her body, and then in a
moment of compassion decided to hide his also. The woman, in turn,
having been blamed for the whole affair, became coy and pretended
to have no further interest in the matter.
From this creation myth, embellished over the centuries, the
Ana tomy Cult developed to its present form among the N acirema.
The myth system now runs as follows: Virile man was modelled after
an equally virile but lonely god . God in an act of inscrutable wisdom
created a part-man to assuage man's virility, but labelled it sinful
if he did so. The absence of a divine model for females meant that
women were responsible for this state of affairs. If that part of their
body which is most female did not exist, man would be unable to
sin. Since it is important for man not to sin, women must be encouraged to suppress a nd hide their femaleness. Unlike many other
primitive tribes, however, the Nacirema did not segregate the women
into separate compounds but allowed them a certain freedom of
movement. They were never as free as men , though , and until quite
recently could not even participate in tribal decisions.
Psychologically, of course, such a myth system could only produce
a guilt-ridden society. If for no other reason than racial propagation,
men were always sinning and women were always blamed for it. The
real world of sex constantly intruded on the Nacirema and the superstitions constantly condemned them for it. Some witch doctors, in a
desperate effort to be god-like, h ave even resorted to a whole life
of celibacy and would like others to follow suit, but are torn by a
counter-belief tha t god wants people to have children. Other witch
doctors merely warn against enjoying sex, justifying copulation on
the basis that there ought to be children. Thus a complicated system
of interacting taboos and na tu ral needs has developed. Since the
taboos are directed against one of m an's few inna te drives, it is no
wonder that the Nacirema are said to be a sick tribe.
As might be expected when a natural drive of human beings is
frustrated, a reaction formation occurred among the Nacirema. The
interesting aspect of this development is that it was led by women,
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apparently unconsciously motivated by the idea that if they were
going to be responsible for sin they might as well make it exciting.
Through the course of Nacirema history they had attemepted to make
the most of the great quantity of cloth men forced them to wear. They
put frills on the cloth and cut and molded it to the body. Borrowing
a leaf from the Chinese practice of foot-binding, they began to give
the illusion of small feet by wearing blocks of wood under their heels.
They also adapted the arb and eldrig, which we mentioned earlier,
to create illusions about the bosom and hips. But there was only so
much one could do when covered from head to feet. The next step,
therefore, was to start cutting away the cloth. \Vomen's arms, then
their legs appeared, followed by back, waist and much of their bosom.
A revolution was under way and with it the full fruition of the Anatomy
Cult, discussed in the first part of this paper.
As a result of the above-described developments, other and more
diverse forms of Body-oriented innovations have occurred. All kinds
of magical herbs have been invented to make women beautiful. Clothmen have grown rich creating every conceivable form of attire. An
ironical abandonment has seized women, who for one occasion will
pile on the cloth and for another will practically dispense with it.
They wear some cloth which is invisible and some which is porous.
For occasions like swimming they wear tiny pieces of cloth which have
to be stretched over the evil parts. They have recently invented an arbless arb which gives the illusion of being an arb without the restrictions
of one. Some bold women with large breasts will even dispense with all
cloth above the waist while working in men's eating and drinking
houses. Ironically, such women are referred to as topless ( which apparently is an example of a suppression complex on a mass basis ).
Some women have even organized to have the arb outlawed on the
grounds that it is a demeaning garment which leads to hypocritical but
silent boasts by those who wear it.
Another unusual activity is the aesthetic contest, the prime feature
of which is that young women display most of the Body. This contest
is undoubtedly a vestige of an earlier form of virgin sacrifice. Today,
no examination is made for virginity, although contestants are expected
to be unmarried. Winners are now sacrificed to a commercial orgy
for one year. Winners at the clan level compete once each year for
the honor of being chosen Miss Nacirema. The woman so honored
receives great wealth and an adulating public openly discusses her
Body measurements. In spite of the public obsession with her Body,
the winner is never permitted to appear absolutely nude. In view
of the other developments, however, this may be a simple case of
culture lag.
Older women emulate the aesthetic contest by engaging in cloth
parades where they display the idealized Body as created by cloth
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and illusion. The latter is especially significant in a spring holiday
called "Retsae" which is devoted almost entirely to a display of Bodyworn cloth. It is a fertility rite with strong taboos against any act
of fertility. The Body has become the center of existence.
Women , reacting to a creation myth which made them inferior,
have twisted the whole system into a cult in which the Body itself
is worshipped. Witch doctors have condemned these developments,
but have lost much of their earlier authority. Nacirema men as a
whole also opposed the changes at first, but then discovered they liked
them. Since contact with advanced civilizations has made them less
conscious of sin, men too have joined in the cult, focusing considerable a ttention on their own Bodies.
The m yth system, of course, still exists. Since it is theoretically
contradictory to the Anatomy Cult it has created, there is as yet
considerable frustration in the society. The irony in the Cult is that
it may contain the seeds of its own destruction. If the Nacirema finally
come to accept the sex-adorned body as a very natural and useful
and enjoyable thing (and that appears to be the evolutionary direction of their history ), the cult itself should wither as it has in advanced
civilizations. Such an event would probably also destroy the creation
myth, a nd an advanced society free from sex-guilt would probably
be on its way. As I said earlier, however, it will still probably take
a few generations for this to happen. The Anatomy Cult at this stage
of Nacirema evolution seems firmly entrenched.

0000=====
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A Most Promising Start
Environment for Man. The Next Fifty Years, Edited by William R.
Ewald, Jr.; Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, Pub.
1967. 308 pages.
This book, a modest compilation of source materials and ideas on
environment and community, is the first of a series of three volumes
to be issued by the American Institute of Planners (AIP). The projected series is intended to be a two-year national consultation to
look into the THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS / 1967-2017. This will be
done through conferences. The aims of the conferences which have
been planned are many. Those aims will be efforts to answer certain
questions of interest to most social and beha vioral scientists. Among
the questions to which conferees will seek an answer are the
following. ( 1) What can we expect the future environment of
democracy to be, that is to say, how can the art and science of city
planning be expanded so as to include the role of art, spirit, science
and technology in creating the future environment of a democracy?
( 2) If we possessed an emerging technology and economy to build
a proper environment and authentic communities for men, what
would they be like? (3) How should we define an "ideal environment" which can be made possible by the onrush of new developments in science and technology? ( 4) What kind of environments
can facilitate what might be consensually spoken of as a "good day"?
( 5) In principle, is it possible to define and then construct in our
time an optimum environment with man as its measure? (6) What
are the proper criteria for evaluating past professional planning successes and failures? (7) How can we redefine pragmatism so that it
will refer not only to something that works now but also something
that will work in the future? The reason for posing this last objective
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is tha t much of the membership of the AIP, and the other professional
organizations which are cooperating on these planned conferences,
is now convinced of the practical importance and genuine possibility
of looking ahead and planning for our national and regional futures.
They share the attitudes of such persons as the members of the Commission On The Year 2000 and of Bertrand De Jouvenel, a pioneer
in the new field of studies concerned with projections of the future,
particularly by the means which De Jouvenel laid down in his The
Art Of Conjecture.
Part I of the planned series is devoted to defining what is meant
by an optimum environment. Part II, the next volume, will be aimed
at articulating an appropriate social philosophy for the next 50 yearsa social philosophy aimed at creating a pluralistic society in which
the fate, contentment and authentic development of the individual
will be paramount and in which freedom and responsibility can be
guaranteed for all. This will have to be social philosophy geared to
the new and emerging possibilities for man's environment; possibilities
which are rooted to the coming, new developments in science and
technology. In addition, this second volume will try to achieve an
understanding of the values of our society and the great changes
which lie ahead for it, and that volume will propose specific policies
and programs that must be considered if these kinds of understanding
are, in fact, valid. Part III, the third volume, will furnish the contributions from, and the results of, six to ten regional conferences which
will subsequently be called to refine and test the conclusions arrived
at in the second volume.
It is intended that all three volumes will include relevant nonempirical as well as definitive, empirical data. The creative policies
and programs to be proposed in Part II will lean heavily upon the
resources of computer technology. In addition, conferees intend to
make all three volumes truly "interdisciplinary." They will be interdisciplinary not in the sense of merely juxtaposing findings from the
specialized disciplines, which is the commonplace, antiquated, mongrelized and now dysfunctional version of the term, "interdisciplinary,"
but rather in the sense of developing hitherto unseen relationships
among the findings of the special disciplines, relationships which will
have a direct bearing upon the aims of all three of the conferences.
The interdisciplinary approach will carry the additional meaning of
applying methodologies and modes of analysis, usually employed in
other types of context, to the objectives of the conferees. The nature
of such methodology deserves some slight expansion at this point.
One such methodology, for instance, is what has come to be called
the matrix approach and is an attempt to enumerate in tabular, matrix
form all those variables which are important components of the environment, particularly in relation to community planning. These
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variables are set up, using the matrix approach, so as to be able to
develop empirically (and, if need be, theoretically) the functional
relationships among them. If, then, there are meaningful combinations
of some of these variables, they can be found by the technique known
as principal component analysis. By this technique it is also possible
to locate clusters of variables which vary simultaneously, so that thereafter the matrix can be subjected to factor analysis. If it is desired to
reduce the large number of variables to a set of fewer and more basic
components, that can be done by the application of certain types of
correlation analysis. Optimal solutions to achieving communities exhibiting given attributes, but where the expressions of these attributes
are subject to various types of constraint, involve what is called a
Trade-Off Matrix (Relation of Function to Function), and these
optimal solutions can be achieved by such sophisticated mathematical
and statistical techniques as interactive matrix manipulation, simulation and random sampling.
The editor of the Yolume stresses the consideration that the purposes of the conferences are based upon the recognition of the following fact. As a result of our growing social complexity, planners and
social scientists are finding it harder and harder to understand the
natural as well as the artifactual environments of men. Ewald suggests
that there are four reasons for our impoverished understanding of
the human environment. These reasons are the following. ( 1) Increasing population and population density make it too risky to
try to deal with the human environment by trial and error, since
both the social and the monetary costs are becoming too great.
(2) The market is growing so large and the state of the housing
industry is so decrepit that there is now an opportunity for profit for
many different industries in new concepts of environment. (3) The
achievements of our affluent society have created a new human environment, accompanied by social pathologies whose elimination is creating major, political attention and conflict of interest. (4) Because of
the possibilities inherent in computer technology, planners, politicians
and the educated and concerned public, now can study and treat
our socially and physically unwieldy environment as a system of multivariable, complex relationships. The ability to do this makes it possible
for man to adapt his environment to a creative and satisfying social
philosophy in contrast to the traditional ecological approach in which
man is expected to adapt or resign himself to the environment as
given. The reader should note that, if this fourth assertion is sound,
then the pessimism shown by Jacques Ellul in his book, The Technological Society, in which this author declared that man could not
escape the pathological imperatives of technology, can be cheerfully
dismissed.
At this point, then, it will be most appropriate to select some of
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the more interesting papers from the volume and provide brief synopses of their content.
The papers contributed are highly varied. Rene Dubos deals with
the need for a new science of environmental biomedicine. John W.
Dyckman discusses the concept of an optimum environment for modern man. Christopher Alexander furnishes a penetrating analysis of
what he calls the autonomy-withdrawal syndrome, that is, the behavior
which results in loss of intimate contact and the complex of urban
factors which produce that syndrome. Bertram M. Gross predicts the
appearance of regional megalopoli, followed by a single, polynuclear
supermegalopolis. He rejects our present model of city living-the
City of Things-based upon high mass-consumption. He discusses
at length the model that must replace it, the City of Man or Anthropolis, the city in which there will not be fewer things but more things
that truly serve human interests and which will restore gemeinschaft
to the post-industrial age. Stanley J. Hallet discusses the important
topic of planning and politics and W. L. Rogers discusses the value
of the applications of interdisciplinary methodolgy-systems theory
and environmental science-to society and city planning. For Rogers
the effectiveness of the systems approach in city planning will depend to
a considerable degree on the ability of planners and social scientists
to define operationally such concepts as "health," "convenience,"
"esthetics" and "happiness." The volume also includes three papers
devoted to theory governing the form, structure, physical appearance,
neighborhood design and functions of the urban center and which
are also addressed, at the same time, to the technical problems of
dealing with these attributes. These all reflect the city planner's traditional concern with the physical exploitation of space and with the
relation of physical space to cultural space. A separate paper deals
with the role of business and investment in changing the human
environment.
This volume does not, by any means, contain the answers to the
problems it poses. In fact, whatever answers are to be supplied will
come, of course, in the next two volumes. Even, however, within the
framework of its more restricted purposes, it has deficiencies-as any
volume does on any subject. I should like to mention only two of
these deficiencies here and I am mentioning these two only because
they arc so central to the improvement of environment for man.
The first deficiency is that the contributors to the first conference
did not focus attention upon the fact that all the errors now being
made in determining the increasingly dysgenic nature of the American
environment, are being currently intensified. They are being intensified
by industry, by land speculators, real-estate operators and developers,
the automobile manufacturers, the traditional types of planners of
the physical city, by highway engmeers, by the construction industry
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and by all the other human and institutional sources that can justifiably
be listed on any roster of culprits. As a result-and this is the pointthe American environment may be brought to a state where there
will be a point of no return, a point at which the most practical and
idealistic plans will not have a ghost of a chance of being adapted
to the mess we have made of things. We need community plans as
well as plans for environmental control, all of which are aimed at
unscrambling such messes in the future, regardless of their nature
and extent. Such plans would be contingency measures against the
time when the public finally wakes up, cries "enough" and asks that
our planners begin all over again. You will find no such "cushionplans" dealt with at all as antidotes towards the ugly future to which
we seem to be moving, if present decision-makers, with respect to
community construction and planning, remain in the saddle. This
neglect should, of course, be repaired in the forthcoming conferences
and volumes.
The second deficiency is the complete failure, due to lack of
venturesomeness on the part of all of the contributors, to consider
planning in relation to a philosophy of decentralization instead of
thinking of planning almost solely in terms of the centralizing and
bureaucratizing trends of the times. Many new developments in science and technology, such as those described in the 1963 NASA publication, Conference On Space, Science, And Urban Life, are peculiarly adaptable to small-scale, physically decentralized communities
and to small-scale, controlled environments. Many inventions, scientific
developments and new technologies, brought into being in connection
with such contexts as space exploration and technology, oceanographic
exploration and research, and new planetary communications technologies, are cases in point. So too are some of the results of research
on cyborgs and bioengineering, the use of Buckminster Fuller's innovations via the Dymazion principle and the geodesic dome, organized
developments of eco-systems and dozens of other recent and important
developments too numerous to mention here. All such recent developments may prove to be more serviceable in the development of smallscale, physically and socially decentralized communities, than in the
development of the highly centralized megalopoli and supermegalopoli
that Gross foresees. The relevance and applicability of such developments to architecture and community planning has been explicitly
recognized in the publication, 2000+, which is a reprint of the British
journal, Architectural Design (February, 1967). Then, too, the use
of systems analysis-which the contributors to this volume make so
much of-can be even more successful in less complex, small-scale
systems, such as those expressed by a scientifically designed, highly
efficient, decentralized community, than in the large and socially
complex systems (regions) which the contributors had in mind in
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producing this volume. Nevertheless, the possibilities for scientifically
decentralized a nd controlled communities and environments have
been completely neglected by the contributors. Here, too, we can only
hope that this negligence will be repaired in the forthcoming conferences and volumes.
But when all is said and done, this book is a most promising start
in the direction of the aims and objectives of the planned conferences
to which we referred a t the beginning of this review. One really has
to read the volume to a pprecia te it and to realize the importance of
methodology in the design of improved environments for man. The
authors, on the whole, reflect the best of C. P. Snow's two cultures, in
their personal outlooks. The quality of mind and the cultural outlook
which should be brought to bear upon the pleasant task of reading
this volume are most likely to be a product of training in the social
and behavioral sciences, underwritten by a genuine sensitivity to our
humanist traditions. The quality tha t is least likely to fit the reader
for a proper appreciation of this volume, is to be a prisoner of historical perspective. This is why, perhaps, the volume was blindly and
incomprehendingly treated by J. H . Plumb, the British historian, in
Saturday Review (July 29, 1967 ), so much so that the editor of the
volume had to complain in a later issue of that same journal. The
volume has no place in the hands of the negative classicist, that is,
the smug scholar with a cryptic distaste for the role and relevance of
methodology and a preference for the well-turned phrase, as the
proper method of illumina ting all our difficulties. This is the scholar
who thinks the answers to all problems, really, are to be found
embedded somewhere in the realm of classical learning and that they
will surely be found there if only we look carefully enough.
Henry Winthrop
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